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ARGUMENT 
L RESPONDENT'S ANTI-JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT 
MISCONSTRUES MR. PEARSON'S CLAIMS AND THE 
COURT'S DECISION TO REINSTATE THE APPEAL. 
Petitioner's opening brief ("Brief') provides a clear basis for this Court's 
jurisdiction and observes that the Court has already decided in favor of hearing the 
appeal. See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 1. Mr. Pearson will not belabor the issue, but will alert 
the Court of the inconsistencies and misstatements that form the basis of 
Respondent's argument. 
First, Respondent attempts to limit this Court's jurisdiction by stating as 
conclusive the finding disputed on appeal - that Mr. Pearson was an at-will 
employee. Respondent acknowledges that the Court "has subject matter jurisdiction 
under § 10-3-1106 to review the actual discharge . . . of an employee who is not at-
will," but argues that Mr. Pearson, who is in fact appealing his discharge on the 
basis that he is not at-will, does not qualify for review. Resp. Br., p. 29. The only 
way to reconcile these two statements is to view the "not at-will" requirement as 
being one decided by the responding party, as if the statute were to read: "an 
employee who is not at-will in the opinion of respondent" This approach is 
inaccurate. Where jurisdiction hinges upon a fact in dispute, the Petitioner's prima 
facie claim is controlling until the court makes a final determination. See Lee v. 
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Frank's Garage & Used Cars, Inc., 97 P.3d 717, 719, n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
Here, Mr. Pearson's employment status is the core question before the Court and 
cannot be determined without full consideration on the merits. 
Adding to Respondent's inconsistency is the fact that Rule 4-08(4)(c) of 
South Jordan City Employee Policy specifically states that Mr. Pearson may appeal 
Respondent's determinations to this Court. See R. 152. While the internal rule is 
not controlling, it shows that Respondent previously reviewed the jurisdictional 
statutes and determined that this Court has jurisdiction to review its decisions. 
Thus, Respondent argues that its legal interpretations are beyond review while 
simultaneously arguing that its policies misstate the law. 
Next, Respondent states that Mr. Pearson has "pursued his appeal to the 
Appeals Board as a grievance of his status, not as a grievance of the propriety of his 
discharge." Resp. Br. p. 29. This argument ignores that, under the present 
circumstances, these challenges are the same. Mr. Pearson is appealing the 
propriety of his discharge, which was based completely on his employment status. 
See Pet'r Init. Br., p. 11. But for Respondent's finding that he was at-will, he 
would not have been discharged. 
Similarly, Respondent incorrectly interprets Mr. Pearson's alternative 
argument. Mr. Pearson argues that if his position is among those excluded from the 
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statute, it simply means that the statute is irrelevant and does not dictate any 
employment status, leaving Respondent free to offer him full merit employment. 
See Id. at pp. 12-13. Respondent inaccurately restates this argument as being that 
"even if Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 did not apply to him so that he was at-will 
under the statute, he was removed from statutory at-will status by an express or 
implied-in-fact employment agreement." Resp. Br. p. 28 (emphasis added). 
Respondent's jurisdictional arguments do not have merit where they repeatedly 
misstate the issues and law to its advantage. 
Finally, Respondent argues that the Court has not made any decision 
regarding jurisdiction, stating that the Court's June 18, 2008 Orders (R. 32, 34) 
should be viewed as merely "acknowledging the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction." Id. at p. 27. This argument fails to recognize that the Court 
fully reinstated the case and has proceeded with briefing. The Court reviewed all 
aspects of the jurisdictional argument, including the arguments made in the Petition 
for Permission to Appeal and its own jurisdictional analysis prior to the initial 
transfer. R. 32, 34. Had the Court determined that neither court had jurisdiction, it 
would have simply granted the interlocutory appeal and dismissed the action 
pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Ut. R. App. P. 
10(e) ("The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as it directs, may 
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dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks jurisdiction."). 
II. RESPONDENT'S MARSHALLING ARGUMENT 
INACCURATELY STATES THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
AND FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE INSUFFICIENCY 
OF ITS OWN FINDINGS. 
Marshalling the evidence "is not, itself, a rule of substantive law." Martinez 
v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42,f19; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). It is a tool 
crafted to ease the Court's burden in assessing the weight of factual evidence, i.e. 
determining whether "the [factual] findings are supported by substantial evidence." 
Whitear v. Labor Comm % 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Questions of 
law do not require marshalling because no deference is given to the findings below. 
See Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT 7, f 7 ("Marshalling requirement applies only to 
challenges of factual findings, not conclusions of law."); Utah County v. 
Alexander son, 2003 UT APP 153, \ 8 (mistakes of law are reviewed under a 
correctness standard). The Court must determine the correct rule of law as intended 
by the legislature. 
The marshalling requirement is triggered where the fact finder sets forth 
findings sufficient to facilitate a "meaningful review of the decision's evidentiary 
basis." Woodardv. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "The findings 
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Armed 
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Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f^ 28 (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). Where "the findings are not of that caliber, appellant need not 
go through a futile marshalling exercise" because "meaningful review of a 
decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible." Fazzio at 477 (citing State v. 
Lovegren, 708 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Respondent's decision is far from the formal findings of fact and conclusions 
of law typically issued by trial courts and required to trigger the marshalling 
requirement. Indeed, Respondent's final decision is a lifeless one sentence 
statement: "The Board determined that Mr. Pearson was an 'at-will' employee." R. 
21. 
It would be impossible for Mr. Pearson to review the decision's evidentiary 
basis or play "devil's advocate," let alone "ferret out a fatal flaw" in the evidence. 
Martinez at \ 17. Respondent's one sentence finding has put the Court "in the 
awkward position of having to speculate about what [Respondent] actually 
determined the facts to be without the benefit of the guidance that proper factual 
findings are meant to provide." Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 478, n.7 
Irrespective of the decision's shortcomings, the issue before this court is 
"whether the South Jordan Employee Appeals Board misinterpreted] Utah Code 
Ann. §10-3-1105 and erroneously conclude[d] that Daniel Pearson was an at-will 
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employee." See Pet'r Ink. Br. p. 7. The case hinges on whether § 10-3-1105 
mandates the at-will status of an Assistant Police Chief. This case it is not 
"extremely fact-intensive" as required to trigger the marshalling requirement 
because the only determinative fact, Mr. Pearson's job title, is not in dispute. United 
Park City Mines v. Sticking Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT 35, ^ f 25. 
In his Brief, Mr. Pearson rebuts any argument that other facts, such as Mr. 
Pearson's job description, are relevant to the statutory analysis: 
Respondent relies on Mr. Pearson's job description as evidence that he 
was the equivalent of a deputy police chief. This position disregards 
Respondent's duty to observe Utah's title specific statutory scheme. A 
job description cannot change the position's title where the title has 
legal significance under the Utah Code. Both parties agree that Mr. 
Pearson's title was Assistant Police Chief. 
Pet'r Init. Br. at p. 9 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Pearson's alternative argument is based on another undisputed fact: that 
the Appeals Board never evaluated the evidence of a merit employee contract 
because the case was decided on superseding grounds - that the statute mandated 
his at-will status. See Resp. Br. P. 28 ("Utah Code Ann. § 10-5-1105 did not apply 
to hi so that he was at-will under the statute . . . statutorily at-will." 
Mr. Pearson's Brief does rebut the argument that his job description was the 
same as would be expected of a Deputy Police Chief. Id. at pp. 9-10. He also states 
that Mr. Pearson had a merit employee contract. Id. at p. 14. These statements do 
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not change the issues on appeal or transform Mr. Pearson's argument into a factual 
one. Mr. Pearson's request remains that the Court review Respondent's 
interpretations of law as applied to the undisputed facts. 
While Mr. Pearson believes the Court could go as far as to order Mr. 
Pearson's reinstatement, he acknowledges that the most likely relief is to "remand 
the matter back to the Appeals Board for review in accordance with the correct 
interpretations of law." Id. at 15, n.3. 
III. RESPONDENT INTERPRETS UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 10-3-1105 TO ADVANCE ITS OWN AGENDA WHILE 
IGNORING THE STATUTE'S PLAIN LANGUAGE. 
Respondent's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 claims that the 
statute's plain language is too ambiguous to be taken at face value. Resp. Br. p. 34 
As Respondent acknowledges, the Court should "not look beyond the [statute's] 
plain language" unless it "finds some ambiguity in it." Resp. Br. p. 34; Utah Pub. 
Employee Ass 'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, f^ 59. In attempting to find such ambiguity, 
Respondent ignores the statute's clear distinction between an assistant and deputy 
and applies a new standard not discussed anywhere in the statute - whether the 
position involves "policy-making." Resp. Br. p. 35 
Determining whether a statute's language is ambiguous "depends not only on 
the text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text of the statute as a 
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whole." Utah Pub. Employees at f 60. In this case, the statute makes a specific 
distinction between deputies and assistants: 
(d) a deputy police chief of a municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 (emphasis added). 
The legislature would not have placed "or assistant" into the statute were the 
two positions identical. If the distinction was inserted for mere clarification (i.e., to 
make sure the reader understands that deputy includes assistants), it would have 
made a similar statement in reference to deputy police chiefs. The inclusion of 
"assistants" in referencing fire chiefs but not police chiefs demonstrates that the 
exclusion of assistant police chiefs was intentional. 
Respondent claims that public policy supports inclusion of assistant police 
chiefs. Resp. Br. p. 35. The more important policy consideration is that an 
individual be given notice of whether or not his or her position is covered under § 
10-3-1105. Respondent's view requires an assistant police chief to guess that the 
legislature was referring to assistants as well as deputies, even though it treats them 
differently in the context of fire departments. 
Moreover, Respondent's claim that "the legislature intends only to protect the 
jobs of employees who are not in policy-making positions" is unsupported. Resp. 
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Br. p. 35. The legislature gave municipalities the authority to exclude certain 
employees from the protections of § 10-3-1105 by assigning the employee a job 
title specifically listed. If it meant to do so, Respondent should have conformed 
Mr. Pearson's job title to the statute, instead of expecting it to work the other way 
around. 
IV. RESPONDENT'S NEW CONTRACT ARGUMENT 
CANNOT OVERCOME ITS ERRONEOUS STATUTURY 
INTERPRETATION OR FAILURE TO CONSIDER MR. 
PEARSON'S CONTRACT CLAIM BEFORE ISSUING ITS 
DECISION. 
Respondent erroneously interprets the statute as removing the ability of 
municipalities to give excluded positions any type of protected or merit status. See 
Resp. Br. P. 28 ("Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 did not apply to him so that he was 
at-will under the statute . . . statutorily at will."). With this belief, the Employee 
Appeals Board did not consider the existence of a merit employment contract and 
did not address the argument in its one sentence decision. It had already determined 
that Mr. Pearson, due to his job title, was statutorily required to be at-will. 
Respondent avoids discussing its statutory interpretation by citing contract 
law and arguing that there was no express or implied-in-fact agreement. This 
discussion comes too late. Respondent cannot now makeup for what it did not do at 
the hearing. If there is a debatable factual issue as to whether Respondent and Mr. 
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Pearson had a merit employment contract, the Court must remand the case back to 
the Appeals Board for review applying the correct interpretations of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing arguments, Mr. Pearson respectfully requests that this 
Court overturn his termination and grant appropriate relief as requested 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Respondent has requested oral argument in this matter. Petitioner agrees that 
oral argument is appropriate. 
Dated this , S day of December, 2008. 
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE 
^ r i & . 
Chad D. Noakes 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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